I’m going to do something I almost never do: I’m going to go out on a limb.  I’m going to say that I don’t think Putin will invade Ukraine. I think Putin holds to a maxim well-known to chess players: the threat is often more potent than the execution of the threat. (Chess is very popular in Russia.)  Putin is trying to use the threat of invasion to extract concessions from the West.  But he knows that the execution of the threat would be disastrous for Russia, not only or mainly because of sanctions but because an invasion would be costly in blood and treasure.  The Ukrainian military is no cream puff; a Russian invasion, though assured of success, would result in significant Russian casualties.  And then the occupation of the conquered Ukraine and the suppression of continuing resistance would make Russia’s troubled subjugation of Chechnya look like a walk in the park.

But President Biden has said that a Russian invasion is practically a certainty.  Do I know something Biden doesn’t know?  Of course not, so I must think that Biden is being less than truthful in his claim to near certainty. Threat inflation has a long history in American foreign policy (cf. Bush, G.W. & Cheney) and I wouldn’t assume that Biden is immune from the temptation to follow in that tradition.  Throughout this crisis the US has been the leading alarmist among our allies.  The Ukrainians, by contrast, have been relatively chill. Strange, no?

So, why would the Biden administration be inclined to exaggerate the Russian threat to Ukraine? One possibility is that the administration sees the crisis as an opportunity to reassert US leadership of Europe through NATO, continuing to repair the damage wrought by Trump.  So, the bigger and scarier the crisis, the better, as long as no real harm is done in the end. Another possibility is that the Bidenites see an opportunity for a needed foreign policy triumph post-Afghanistan: when the Russians back down, as expected, America can claim credit for steely strength in the face of threat.  (Does all this sound too cynical to you?  Bless your heart!)

I am going to make one caveat to my no-invasion prediction.  I could see Putin doing a limited invasion that doesn’t extend beyond the neighboring Russian-speaking Donbas region.  It could be done fairly quickly with relatively few casualties, and the occupation of a region with a relatively friendly populace wouldn’t be so onerous. Even this limited invasion would have terrible consequences for Russia, Europe and the US. I think it less than likely, but not wildly improbable.

Am I right?  We will know before too long.

 

One comment

  1. Donald Campbell February 22, 2022 at 10:43 am

    I think your post is prescient as the limited invasion has already occurred. It’s strange that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is no longer spoken by the pundits, some going as far as to say that this issue has little bearing on the current situation. It’s clear that the west will not recognize the sovereignty of the region Russia has invaded and will say they are part of the Ukraine. Given this, if the Ukraine did join Nato, wouldn’t it automatically trigger ‘article 5,’ NATO’s joint defense clause, precipitating a war?

    From this perspective Russia is precluding Ukraines membership in NATO by annexing those two regions. Of course this calculation is fraught with difficulties and the possibility of accidental triggers for further conflict are preponderant.

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